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With the spectre of a recession looming in the eurozone 
(and elsewhere), the policy question arises as to how much 
leeway do the ﬁ scal authorities in the eurozone have to fol-
low counter-cyclical ﬁ scal policies aimed at providing some 
stimulus to the economy.
This question is important because it appears that the ca-
pacity of the European Central Bank (ECB) to provide for 
such a stimulus is limited. The ECB has fl ooded the markets 
with trillions of euros in liquidity (money base) since 2015. It is 
difﬁ cult to see how adding a couple of hundred billion euros 
of money base, most of which is likely to be hoarded or put to 
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use for speculative activities, will provide a signiﬁ cant stimu-
lus for economic activity in the eurozone.
The latter is made very clear in Figure 1. We observe that 
since 2015 when the ECB initiated its quantitative easing 
(QE) programme, the money base increased by 166 percent 
(from 1.2 trillion euro to 3.2 trillion euro), while at the same 
time the money stock increased by a mere 20 percent. This 
leads to the conclusion that most of the two trillion euro 
money base created by the ECB failed to ﬁ lter through to 
the real economy. It is unlikely that adding more money 
base into the economy will change this picture signiﬁ cantly.
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that the 
burden of business cycle stabilisation in the eurozone will 
have to come from the ﬁ scal authorities. The question then 
becomes how much leeway the ﬁ scal authorities have to 
perform their stabilisation responsibilities taking into account 
that these authorities have signiﬁ cant levels of outstanding 
debt. There is a considerable reluctance among policymak-
ers these days to use ﬁ scal policies for stabilisation pur-
poses. This reluctance is mainly driven by the fear that these 
policies may lead to a surge in government debt and in so 
doing quickly become unsustainable.
Importance of interest rate regimes
It is well known that when the nominal interest rate on the 
public debt exceeds the nominal growth rate of GDP, the 
debt-to-GDP ratio will become unstable (will grow to in-
ﬁ nity) unless the government produces a surplus on its 
primary budget balance (i.e. the budget balance that ex-
cludes interest payments). It is easy to see why this is so. 
Suppose the primary balance is zero. This implies that the 
government is ﬁ nancing its interest spending by debt is-
sue. This is sometimes called a Ponzi scheme. The debt 
will increase at a rate given by the interest rate. The GDP, 
however, increases at the rate given by the growth rate of 
GDP. This implies that the numerator in the debt-to-GDP 
ratio increases faster than the denominator. The only way 
to stop this snowball effect is to ﬁ nance at least part of 
interest spending by taxation, i.e. by producing a surplus 
in the primary government balance.
Figure 1
Money base and money stock (M3) in the eurozone, 
2007-2019
N o t e : 2007 = 100.
S o u rc e : European Central Bank: Statistical Data Warehouse.
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Figure 2
Interest rate regimes in selected eurozone countries, 
2013-2018
N o t e s : The ﬁ gure shows r - g, where r stands for the interest rate and g 
for the growth rate of GDP; Ireland was excluded for 2015 – this was the 
year Ireland had a GDP growth rate exceeding 30% resulting from special 
accounting procedures.
S o u rc e : European Commission: AMECO database.
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Figure 3
Interest rate regimes in selected eurozone countries, 
2016-2018 average
N o t e : The ﬁ gure shows r - g, where r stands for the interest rate and g for 
the growth rate of GDP.
S o u rc e : European Commission: AMECO database.
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Interest rate regimes and budget constraints
Countries that experience an interest rate regime in which r 
> g (where r is the interest rate and g the growth rate of GDP) 
are therefore very much constrained in the use of ﬁ scal poli-
cies. This is much less so in countries where r < g. In the lat-
ter countries, the inherent dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
will tend to be stable, i.e. even if the government ﬁ nances all 
interest spending by debt issue, the debt-to-GDP ratio will 
tend to decline. There is therefore no need to produce a sur-
plus in the primary budget balance. It is clear that in those 
countries facing a favourable interest rate regime, it is unnec-
essary for the ﬁ scal authorities to ﬁ nance interest spending 
by taxation. This has the effect of producing a softer budget 
constraint, thereby allowing for more choices in the use of 
ﬁ scal policies for stabilisation purposes.1
Prevailing interest rate regime in eurozone countries
Figure 2 shows the evolution of r - g since 2013 (the ﬁ rst year 
after the sovereign debt crisis). We observe that r - g declined 
in all the examined eurozone countries. The effect of this de-
cline is that, with the exception of Greece and Italy, all ana-
lysed eurozone countries now proﬁ t from a favourable inter-
est rate regime in which r - g < 0. In Figure 3, we take the aver-
age over the last three years and we come to the same con-
1 O. B l a n c h a rd : Public Debt and Low Interest Rates, Presidential Ad-
dress at the American Economic Association annual meeting, 4 Janu-
ary 2019, available at https://www.aeaweb.org/aea/2019conference/
program/pdf/14020_paper_etZgfbDr.pdf.
clusion, i.e. most countries of the eurozone (except Greece 
and Italy) have been in a favourable interest rate regime.
Figures 2 and 3 use the market rates. This measures the mar-
ginal cost of issuing debt. The latter may diverge from the 
average interest cost of the government debt. Therefore, we 
made the same calculations using the average interest cost. 
The results, shown in Figures 4 and 5, turn out to be similar to 
the ones we obtained using the market rate.
Policy choices and sustainability of government debt
We perform an analysis of the policy choices and the sustain-
ability of the government debt using a behavioural macroe-
conomic model as developed by De Grauwe and De Grauwe, 
Foresti and Ji.2 This is a model that produces booms and 
busts in economic activity endogenously and that, therefore, 
seems to be appropriate to analyse the effectiveness and the 
trade-offs that authorities face when confronted with the dy-
namics of booms and busts.
Behavioural macroeconomic model
In contrast with the existing dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models based on rational expectations, 
2 P. D e  G r a u w e : Lectures on Behavioral Macroeconomics, 2012, 
Princeton University Press; P. D e  G r a u w e , P. F o re s t i , Y. J i : Fiscal 
Policies in Booms and Busts, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13740, 
2019, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3391087.
Figure 4
Interest rate regimes in selected eurozone countries, 
2013-2018
Figure 5
Interest rate regimes in selected eurozone countries, 
2016-2018 average
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N o t e : The ﬁ gure shows ar - g, where ar stands for the average interest 
rate on the existing government debt and g for the growth rate of GDP; 
Ireland was excluded for 2015 – this was the year Ireland had a GDP 
growth rate exceeding 30% resulting from special accounting proce-
dures.
S o u rc e : European Commission: AMECO database.
N o t e : The ﬁ gure shows ar - g, where ar stands for the average interest 
rate on the existing government debt and g for the growth rate of GDP.
S o u rc e : European Commission: AMECO database.
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our model takes the view that agents have cognitive limita-
tions preventing them from having rational expectations. 
Instead, these agents use simple rules of behaviour (heuris-
tics). The model introduces rationality by assuming that in-
dividuals learn from their mistakes and are willing to switch 
to the better performing rule. This model produces endog-
enous business cycles driven by ‘animal spirits’, i.e. market 
sentiments of optimism and pessimism that create, in a self-
fulﬁ lling way, booms and busts and are infl uenced by these. 
The model also predicts that periods of tranquility alternate 
with booms and busts, the timing of which, however, cannot 
easily be predicted.
One important characteristic of this model is that the effects 
of policy shocks depend on the initial conditions (the state of 
the economy). In particular, the ﬁ scal multipliers obtained in 
this model depend on the state of the economy. This is a key 
feature allowing us to analyse how ﬁ scal policy can be used 
in different business cycle conditions.
Fiscal multipliers and animal spirits
Figure 6 shows the results of computing the ﬁ scal multipliers 
in the behavioural model under different initial conditions. We 
simulated 1000 impulse responses of a positive government 
spending shock assuming different initial market sentiments 
(animal spirits) each time.
Panel A shows the frequency distribution of the short-term 
ﬁ scal multipliers (i.e. the response of GDP after four quar-
ters). We observe a wide variation of these multipliers, from 
0.8 to 1.5. We also note two peaks in the distribution, one 
around a multiplier of 1 and another around a multiplier be-
tween 1.2 and 1.3.
Panel B shows the origin of these two peaks and sets out 
the ﬁ scal multipliers (vertical axis) against the state of animal 
spirits in the initial period. These animal spirits are expressed 
as an index varying between -1 and +1. When the index 
equals -1, all agents are pessimistic (i.e. forecast a decline in 
the output gap); when the index is +1 all agents are optimistic 
(i.e. forecast an increase in the output gap); when the index 
is 0, optimistic and pessimistic forecasts cancel out (animal 
spirits are neutral).
We ﬁ nd that when animal spirits are neutral (tranquil peri-
ods), the ﬁ scal multipliers cluster around 1. When animal 
spirits take on extreme values, these ﬁ scal multipliers cluster 
around 1.2 - 1.3. Thus, extreme values of animal spirits tend 
to amplify the effects of a ﬁ scal expansion and lead to mul-
tipliers exceeding 1. Note, however, that there is still a lot of 
noise around the non-linear relation between ﬁ scal multipli-
ers and animal spirits, suggesting that other initial conditions 
affect the size of these multipliers.
Size of ﬁ scal multipliers and the state of the economy
There is increasing empirical support for the view that the 
size of the ﬁ scal multipliers depends on the state of the econ-
omy. In a series of infl uential papers, Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko ﬁ nd that the size of the ﬁ scal multiplier (spending 
multiplier) is state dependent in the US economy during the 
post-war period.3 In particular, they ﬁ nd that the multiplier ex-
3 A. A u e r b a c h , Y. G o ro d n i c h e n k o : Measuring the Output Re-
sponses to Fiscal Policy, in: American Economic Journal: Econom-
ic Policy, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2012, pp. 1-27;  A. A u e r b a c h , Y. G o ro d -
n i c h e n k o : Fiscal Multipliers in Recession and Expansion, in: A. 
A l e s i n a , F. G i a v a z z i  (eds.): Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, 
Chicago 2013, University of Chicago Press, pp. 63-98.
Figure 6
Short-term fi scal multipliers under different initial conditions
Panel A: Frequency distribution of short-term fiscal multipliers Panel B: Short-term fiscal multipliers and animal spirits
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S o u rc e : P. D e  G r a u w e , P. F o re s t i , Y. J i : Fiscal Policies in Booms and Busts, CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13740, 2019, available at https://ssrn.
com/abstract=3391087.
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ceeds 1 during recessions.4 It is important to have this fea-
ture in the model in order to evaluate the ﬁ scal policy choices 
under different conditions of the business cycle.
Trade-offs between stabilising output and debt
The next step in the analysis is to compute the trade-offs 
that ﬁ scal authorities face between stabilising output and the 
debt in our behavioural model, assuming that the debt is kept 
sustainable. As indicated earlier, this model takes into ac-
count the state of the economy when the authorities engage 
in counter-cyclical ﬁ scal policies.
Figure 7 illustrates the trade-offs between the volatility of 
output and public debt. In order to understand these trade-
offs, we start from point A, which demonstrates the points 
of the trade-offs when there is no ﬁ scal stabilisation, i.e. the 
ﬁ scal authorities do not follow anti-cyclical policies. As they 
increase their anti-cyclical ﬁ scal policies, we move up along 
the trade-offs.
We distinguish between different interest rate regimes, 
called rs, where rs = r - g. We allow rs to vary from -3% to + 
3%. Let us ﬁ rst concentrate on rs = r - g < 0. In this regime we 
obtain negatively sloped trade-offs, i.e. when ﬁ scal authori-
ties increase their output stabilisation efforts, this comes at 
4 O. B l a n c h a rd , D. L e i g h : Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multi-
pliers, IMF Working Papers No. 13/1, Washington DC 2013.
the price of increasing the variability of the debt. When rs = 
-0.03, this negative trade-off is relatively fl at, i.e. the cost of 
output stabilisation in terms of debt variability is small. With 
increasing rs, the slope of the trade-offs goes up indicating 
that the cost of stabilisation tends to rise.
When the interest rate regime (rs = r - g) turns positive, we 
observe that these trade-offs tend to bend backwards. Thus, 
in this interest rate regime when anti-cyclical ﬁ scal policies 
become strong enough, the trade-offs become positively 
sloped, i.e. further attempts at stabilising output by varying 
government spending lead to increases in both the variability 
of output and debt. Further attempts to use anti-cyclical ﬁ s-
cal policies then reduce welfare.
In order to understand this result, let us analyse what hap-
pens during a recession. In this case, the ﬁ scal authorities in-
crease spending in order to stabilise output. This leads to in-
creases in the deﬁ cit and thus in government debt. We know, 
however, that when rs > 0, the debt is dynamically unstable 
– except if the authorities keep a sufﬁ ciently positive primary 
balance. The anti-cyclical ﬁ scal policy, however, leads to a 
departure from this condition, thereby destabilising the debt. 
The latter forces the ﬁ scal authorities to reduce spending, 
which offsets the anti-cyclical policy stance. When rs is very 
positive, the underlying instability of the debt is very strong. 
As a result, the need to reduce spending to stabilise the debt 
overwhelms the anti-cyclical policy stance. Fiscal policies as 
a whole become pro-cyclical. Attempts to stabilise output 
lead to more variability of output and debt.
From the preceding it follows that in interest rate regimes in 
which the interest rate exceeds the growth rate of the econo-
my, the use of ﬁ scal policy to stabilise output is severely lim-
ited. The use of ﬁ scal policy to stabilise the business cycle 
can quickly lead to a lose-lose situation in which both the 
government debt and the business cycle are destabilised. 
When the interest rate is lower than the growth rate of the 
economy, this problem does not arise. This is a regime that 
allows the ﬁ scal authorities to follow anti-cyclical policies 
without destabilising government debt.
Interest rate regimes in eurozone countries
We have seen that Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germa-
ny, Belgium, Spain and Finland are in an interest rate regime 
where r - g is close to -2% or lower. France and Portugal 
are also in a favourable interest rate regime, but less spec-
tacularly so. This means that these countries face favour-
able trade-offs allowing them to use anti-cyclical ﬁ scal poli-
cies without destabilising their government debts. Italy and 
Greece, however, do not face these favourable trade-offs 
and risk destabilising their government debt if they engage in 
intense anti-cyclical policies.
Figure 7
Trade-off between stabilisation of output and debt in 
different interest rate regimes
N o t e : The rs stands for interst rate regime with rs = r - g; it is assumed 
here that rs varies from -3% to + 3%.
S o u rc e : Authors’ calculations.
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We conclude that on the whole, most eurozone countries to-
day have the capacity to use ﬁ scal policies as a tool to ﬁ ght a 
looming recession without the risk of destabilising their gov-
ernment debt levels.
Changing budgetary priorities in the eurozone
The previous conclusion can be strengthened by analys-
ing the primary budget balances of the eurozone countries 
shown in Figure 8 and comparing these with the interest rate 
regimes shown in Figure 3. The most striking aspect of this 
comparison is that most eurozone countries show primary 
surpluses while they are in a favourable interest rate regime, 
i.e. r - g < 0, although the latter would allow them to run pri-
mary deﬁ cits while keeping their debt-to-GDP ratios con-
stant. This refl ects the choice in most eurozone countries 
for a policy that prioritises a speedy decline in debt-to-GDP 
ratios. The issue is whether this policy choice continues to 
make sense when the eurozone economy is slowing down.
Leeway for ﬁ scal stimulus in eurozone countries
In Table 1, we compute the primary balances that are needed 
for the debt-to-GDP ratios to remain constant in the euro-
zone countries, the results are shown in the column labelled 
‘(r - g)*Debt’. We compare these with the observed primary 
balances. The difference between the two tells us how much 
ﬁ scal stimulus the country could engage in while keeping 
its debt-to-GDP at the level reached in 2019. The results of 
this calculation are presented in the ‘ﬁ scal stimulus’ column. 
These results are striking: most eurozone countries are in a 
situation in which they could engage in a ﬁ scal stimulus of 
more than two percent of their GDP, with some countries 
reaching three percent or more, while keeping their debt-
to-GDP ratios ﬁ xed. The exceptions are Greece, Italy and 
France, which have relatively little (Italy and France) or no 
(Greece) leeway for stimulus.
One note of warning is in place here. The numbers in the col-
umn ‘(r - g)*Debt’ identify the necessary conditions for debt 
sustainability. They may not be sufﬁ cient. Take Portugal for 
example. The number -1.4% says that Portugal could have 
a primary deﬁ cit of 1.4% that will keep the existing debt-to-
GDP ratio constant at the level of 119.5%. That level, how-
ever, could quickly become unsustainable when some unfa-
vourable shocks occur. Portugal, therefore, may not want to 
use ﬁ scal stimulus today.
Policy impliations: Fiscal stimulus is feasible
We conclude that not all but a signiﬁ cant number of eurozone 
countries (Austria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and 
Finland) could engage in a ﬁ scal stimulus of three percent 
or more of their GDP. Given the present threat of recession, 
these countries should seriously consider changing their 
budgetary priorities, which are currently skewed towards 
fast reductions of their debt-to-GDP ratios, and instead pri-
oritise a ﬁ scal stimulus.
Country
Debt-
to-GDP 
ratio
r - g
(in %)
(r - g)* Debt
(in %)
Observed 
primary 
balance
(in %)
Fiscal 
stimulus
(in %)
Austria 69.7 -3.3 -2.3 1.8 4.1
Belgium 101.3 -2.4 -2.5 0.8 3.3
Finland 58.3 -2.9 -1.7 0.5 2.2
France 99 -1.6 -1.6 -1.5 0.1
Germany 58.4 -3.1 -1.8 1.8 3.6
Greece 174.9 4.8 8.4 4.0 -4.3
Ireland 61.3 -6.4 -3.9 1.4 5.4
Italy 133.7 0 0 1.2 1.2
Netherlands 49.1 -3.4 -1.7 2.2 3.9
Portugal 119.5 -1.2 -1.4 2.9 4.3
Spain 96.3 -2.3 -2.2 0 2.2
Table 1
Leeway for fi scal stimulus in selected eurozone 
countries, 2019
N o t e :  T h e  (r - g)*Debt measures the primary balance that will keep the 
debt-to-GDP ratio at the level of 2019; the last column measures the size 
of the ﬁ scal stimulus that will keep the debt-to-GDP ratio ﬁ xed at the level 
of 2019, given (r - g) in 2019.
S o u rc e : Authors’ calculations.
Figure 8
Primary budget balances of selected eurozone 
countries
S o u rc e : European Commission: AMECO database.
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